The challenging relationship between contemporary art and copyright by Sawyer, Matthew & Karjiker, Sadulla
650
THE CHALLENGING RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY ART AND 
COPYRIGHT
MATTHEW SAWYER
LLM student, Stellenbosch University
SADULLA KARJIKER
Anton Mostert Chair of Intellectual Property Law, Stellenbosch University
This article seeks to address the current wording of the definition of ‘artistic work’ in 
the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. It is argued that such wording has failed to aid courts 
in interpreting it in a way that allows for a broadening of its scope so as to include 
new art forms — most importantly, for this article, multimedia installations. Analysis 
of the Copyright Act’s definition of ‘artistic work’ is applied to four contemporary and 
prominent multimedia installation artworks to determine whether such creations would 
fall within this definition. The outcome of this analysis shows that, although certain 
multimedia installation creations are provided protection under the current definition, 
there are artworks that do not satisfy the requirements under this definition. It is thus 
proposed in this article that certain amendments should be made to the Copyright 
Act that will afford such excluded artistic works copyright protection. Finally, this 
article conducts an analysis of the possible adverse effects that could arise should such 
amendments be effected to the wording of the Copyright Act in terms of the requirements 
of materiality and originality.  Through the application of these two requirements to 
further examples of multimedia installation artworks, the conclusion is reached that these 
requirements would not render the proposed amendments superfluous or problematic.
I   INTRODUCTION
The definition of art can take many different forms, based on a number of 
factors that would influence the perspective of the person who attempts 
to provide a broad, and yet still succinct, explanation of how they define 
this concept. There is, arguably, no universally accepted definition of art, 
although the word is used to describe something of beauty, or a skill, which 
produces an aesthetic result. Both of these elements are very broad and it 
could be argued that any creation that is made up of, but not limited to, 
these two elements should be accepted as an ‘artistic work’ by both society 
and South African copyright law. It is important to note that art reflects and 
belongs to the era in, and culture from, which it was produced. As a result, it 
would be futile to compare prehistoric murals or primitive African art with 
the works of   Van Gogh and Michelangelo.
The concept of  ‘art’ has been shaped by a number of ‘movements’ over 
time, and now extends further than mere single medium or mixed-media 
artworks to art forms that combine visual art with non-visual materials. 
Artists today refer to the term ‘contemporary art’ which, strictly speaking, 
refers to art produced after 1945, when artists began to respond to a global 
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environment that is culturally diverse, industrially advanced and complex. 
Contemporary artists working within the postmodern movement reject 
the concept of mainstream art and use a wide variety of materials, sources 
and styles to create different artworks.1 This becomes somewhat problematic 
when considering the enquiry into copyright protection, as the Copyright 
Act 98 of 1978 (the ‘Act’) is both technical and restrictive in its definitions of 
what constitutes a work, and is inadequate in protecting all of the elements 
present in contemporary artworks.2
Before we are able to discuss the issue of infringement, and whether an 
artist would be able to seek redress for such an infringement with reference 
to the Act, it is important first to discuss how art is exploited. Paintings 
and sculptures are generally infringed by third parties through the direct 
production and sale of such items on the basis that the painting or sculpture 
is the genuine article, or an authorised reproduction thereof. Similarly, 
multimedia installation artworks are exploited by third parties reproducing 
a substantial portion thereof so as to infringe on the rights of the author of 
the work. 
It is important to note that the term ‘installation art’ refers to a relatively 
new genre of contemporary art, which involves the configuration or 
‘installation’ of objects in a space such as a room, art gallery or even within 
public spaces. Further, when we consider the term ‘multimedia art’, it 
can be distinguished from mixed-media art, which is artwork comprising 
multiple types of media. Multimedia art, however, involves a larger scope 
than mixed-media art, and is considered to be less restricted than mixed-
media artworks. The term ‘multimedia installation art’, therefore, refers to 
multimedia artworks that are incorporated into a defined space in order to 
ascribe further meaning to that particular artwork.
If we consider the artwork of Tim Noble & Sue Webster, namely Dirty 
White Trash (With Gulls),3 an unauthorised copy of such an artwork would 
be valued at a fraction of the version that has an accompanying certificate 
of authenticity.   This article, therefore, seeks to prevent exploitation of such 
multimedia installation artworks by amending the definition of ‘artistic 
work’ under s 1 of the Act to recognise such artworks as a ‘work’ for the 
purposes of copyright protection.
The South African system of intellectual property, and more specifically 
copyright law, is arguably justified on rule-utilitarian or economic grounds 
in that rights are granted to the authors of intellectual property to promote 
1 See International Studies in History and Business of Art & Culture 
‘Contemporary art: Definition’ available at https://www.iesa.edu/paris/news-events/
contemporary-art-definition, accessed on 12 September 2019.
2 O H Dean & S Karjiker Handbook of South African Copyright Law (2006) 1–45. 
3 See the annexure at the end of the article.
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further creation and to introduce such works into society.4 The provision 
of such rights to the author of a work seeks to prevent the unauthorised 
exploitation of that author’s work before he or she has been able to recover 
a profit from his or her labour, judgement and skill.
Authors of multimedia installation artworks currently receive no express 
protection in copyright for their specific works.   This is problematic because 
the Act, in relation to multimedia installation artworks, thus fails to achieve 
the very purpose for which it was created, which is to incentivise the creation 
of further works by providing authors with the right to reproduce and 
control the physical embodiments of their creative ideas.5  The substantial 
commercial value associated with multimedia installation art affirms the 
need for the granting of copyright protection, which has the purpose of 
allowing such artists to retain ownership and control over their works.6 
The Act currently defines an ‘artistic work’, irrespective of the artistic quality 
thereof, as paintings, sculptures and works of craftsmanship not falling within 
the specific definitions of the Act.7 From this definition it is apparent that there 
is no express provision for installation or multimedia artworks, thus forcing 
artists to find ways of fitting such forms of art within the existing parameters 
of the Act. Since there is no express provision for ‘installation artworks’, the 
definitions of both sculptures and works of craftsmanship will be the focus 
of this analysis, given the limited scope of associated concepts in this context. 
Such an analysis will allow for a conclusion that will confirm the hypothesis 
that the definition of ‘artistic work’, as it currently stands, does not sufficiently 
protect installation art as either a sculpture or a work of craftsmanship.
Although a study of the issues of copyright subsistence, copyright 
infringement and the defence of fair dealing is necessary to ascertain the 
scope of protection that copyright law can provide to installation artists, 
this article will only address the issue of subsistence of copyright.8 After the 
analysis of such shortcomings, possible solutions will be discussed, namely 
the possible broadening of the scope of the Act in this regard.
Possible problems that may arise would be issues relating to the 
requirement of fixation, as the Act requires a work to be reduced to a 
physical form before it can be considered a ‘work’ in terms of the Act.9   This 
fixation requirement becomes problematic as installation works commonly 
4 A D Moore ‘A Lockean theory of intellectual property’ (1997) 21 Hamline LR 1.
5 Ibid at 2.
6 C Y Neng & D Tan ‘Copyright subsistence in contemporary times: A dead 
shark,  an unmade bed and bright lights in an empty room’ 2013 Singapore Journal of 
Legal Studies 402 at 403.
7 Section 1(1) s v ‘artistic work’.
8 Neng & Tan op cit note 6 at 403.
9 Galago Publishers (Pty) Ltd & another v Erasmus 1989 (1) SA 276 (A), which held 
that there is no copyright in ideas, and it is the material expression of such an idea 
which is the subject of copyright.
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have a set life span, and this article will seek to address whether an artwork 
must exist for a certain period of time before it will be considered as having 
been reduced to a material form. Further, the issue of originality must be 
addressed, as it may be suggested that certain installation artworks that make 
use of ready-made materials, and natural materials will not comply with the 
requirement of originality.10 
II THE SUBSISTENCE OF COPYRIGHT IN MULTIMEDIA 
INSTALLATION ART IN SOUTH AFRICA
Under the Act, an installation artwork must satisfy four main requirements 
in order for copyright to subsist in such a work, thus allowing the owner of 
the copyright to claim protection for that work. First, s 2 of the Act provides 
for two initial requirements that will both be considered, namely (i) the 
creation in question must qualify as a work as provided for in the Act, and 
(ii) such a work must be original. A third requirement under s 2(2) of the Act 
provides that the work must ‘otherwise [be] reduced to a material form’.11
This part of the article will specifically focus on the first two requirements 
for copyright protection: is the creation a ‘work’ for purposes of the Act; 
and, if so, whether such a work is original. This will allow us to consider 
whether the definition of ‘artistic work’ allows for suitable recognition of 
multimedia installation artworks. The first and second requirements will be 
tested against examples of multimedia installation artworks, and conclusions 
will be drawn as to whether such internationally renowned artworks would 
receive protection under the Act. 
(a) The requirements of an ‘artistic work’
The Act defines the term ‘artistic work’ in three separate categories, with 
each category containing a subset of terms which are themselves the subjects 
of definitions within the Act.12 It is important to note that the definition 
of ‘artistic work’ is a numerus clausus, and it therefore does not provide 
for an open-ended list of works that are eligible for copyright protection. 
An important term provided for under subsec (a) of ‘artistic work’ is 
‘sculpture’. Many multimedia installation artworks may fall within the 
definition of this term, and are thus protected under the Act.  The second 
subset of terms that are important for the purposes of this article is provided 
10 This article will seek to clarify the issues of materiality and originality when 
considering multimedia installation artworks.
11 Section 3(1) of the Act then provides for the final requirement, namely 
copyright is conferred on any work where the author is a South African citizen or 
domiciled or resident within the Republic or a Berne Convention country. This will 
also be the case where the work in question is the first published in a convention 
country (s 3(1)(a)).
12 Dean & Karjiker op cit note 2 para 2.6.
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for under subsec (c) of the definition of ‘artistic work’, which provides for 
‘works of craftsmanship’ not falling within the definitions contained in 
either subsecs (a) or (b) of the definition of ‘artistic work’.
In order to determine whether a creation warrants categorisation as a 
‘work’, the court in the case of Waylite Diaries CC v First National Bank Ltd 
held that one must conduct a purely objective test.13 This test requires us to 
consider the subject matter of the creation objectively, and, as indicated in 
Accesso CC v Allforms (Pty) Ltd & another,14 such subject matter must not be 
so trivial so as to be ineligible to be considered a work. The court in the 
case of Marick Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd v Hallmark Hendon (Pty) Ltd15 concluded 
that, under the definition of ‘artistic work’ in s 1(a), any creation of greater 
substance than a mere straight line or circle should fall within this definition.
(i) Multimedia installation artworks defined as an ‘artistic collage’
When considering Marc Lee’s 10 000 Moving Cities — Same but Different, 
it can be seen that the artist makes use of rudimentary shapes upon 
which he projects images that have been uploaded by the public relating 
to different cities around the world.16 When seeking protection under the 
Act, the artist will have to prove that his creation falls within the scope of 
the Act in that such a creation would satisfy the definition of an ‘artistic 
work’ as discussed above. It is important at this point to draw a distinction 
between the protection of a photograph due to its composition, and the 
protection of a collage of photographs.17 The particular artwork in question 
only exists as a collage of photographs and, although each individual photo 
may be a protected copyright work, that which must be considered for 
present purposes is the collective work comprising all the photographs and 
the accompanying installation. Thus, when trying to fit such a creation into 
the definition of artistic work, the author will clearly seek to rely on the 
category of   ‘collage’, which is defined as a creative work that resembles such 
a composition in incorporating various materials or elements.18 Further, the 
artist would have to show that such a creation is not trivial. By applying the 
standard set by the court in Marick Wholesalers,19 a conclusion can be drawn 
that such a creation would not be trivial. 
13 Waylite Diaries CC v First National Bank Ltd 1995 (1) SA 645 (A) at 650.
14 [1998] 4 All SA 665 (T) at 668.
15 (1999) 707 JOC (T) at 716.
16 Marc Lee ‘10.000 Moving Cities – Same but Different, VR (virtual reality)’ 
available at http://marclee.io/en/10-000-moving-cities-same-but-different-vr/, accessed on 
12 September 2019.
17 For purposes of the current discussion, the issue of whether the persons, whose 
images are used in the artwork, are co-authors will not be considered.
18 Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary 10 ed (1999) s v ‘collage’.
19 Marick Wholesalers supra note 15.
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The argument could, however, be raised that the individual photographs 
making up the artwork do not originate from the artist himself, and that the 
individual photographs do not represent any substantial effort on the part 
of the artist in creating the work. The court in the Marick Wholesalers case 
held that when a work is made up of a compilation of common elements 
(and by extension elements not created by the author), the work should not 
be viewed as the individual elements, but rather as the ‘sum of its parts’. 20 
Therefore, the collage as a whole will have to be considered in determining 
whether the author’s expended labour, judgement and skill was adequate to 
meet the requirement of originality. Although the work could be protected 
as a collage, it would fall short of a similar test in relation to its designation 
as a compilation. The problem is that a collection of photographs is not 
necessarily (and usually) itself a photograph, and the Act only recognises 
compilations under the definition of a ‘literary work’.21 Accordingly, it has 
been illustrated that there are examples of multimedia installation artworks 
that do not fall within even the least abstract kind of artistic works, namely 
photographs, and this specific example illustrates the need for new categories 
of artistic work to protect new art forms.22
(ii) Multimedia installation artworks defined as a ‘sculpture’
The reference to sculptures under subsec (a) of the definition of ‘artistic 
work’ demonstrates that a number of three-dimensional works are also 
recognised as ‘artistic works’, which is important when considering that the 
majority of installation artworks are three-dimensional in nature.23   The term 
‘sculpture’ is further defined in the Act as including any cast or model made 
for the purposes of creating a sculpture, but no further mention is made as 
to whether a specific meaning must be attached to the term ‘sculpture’ for 
the purposes of the Act. There is currently no precedent in South Africa 
that can provide guidelines as to how a court should interpret the meaning 
of ‘sculpture’, and we may, therefore, look to cases in other jurisdictions for 
possible guidance on this issue. The provisions of the Act draw from both 
British law and the texts of the Berne Convention and, accordingly, the 
wording of the Act is similar to these above-mentioned texts.   This similarity 
means that any precedent set under these texts would be particularly helpful 
when confronted with problems in South Africa concerning the particular 
20 Ibid at 716.
21 Subsection (g) of the s 1 definition for ‘literary work’.
22 This situation could be addressed fairly easily by the recognition of ‘collage’ as 
a kind of artistic work, as is the case in the UK’s Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 
1998 (the ‘CDPA’).
23 O Dean & A Dyer Dean & Dyer: Introduction to Intellectual Property Law (2014) 11.
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interpretation and application of the Act.   The first important case in Britain 
concerning the interpretation of ‘sculpture’ is the case of Metix (UK) Ltd v 
G H Maughan.24 First, the court in the Metix case held that the term 
‘sculpture’ should be defined as a three-dimensional work made by an 
artist’s hand.25 Although this interpretation is somewhat broad, Laddie J in 
this case held that there was no reason why the meaning of the word should 
be extended further than the ordinary meaning given to it by members of 
the public.26
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in the case of Lucasfilm Ltd 
& others v Ainsworth & another27 specifically addressed the definition of the 
term ‘sculpture’ in order to determine whether the work in question would 
be protected as such. The court in this case was tasked with determining 
whether a prop used in the making of the Star Wars films fell within the 
definition of a sculpture and, in order to make its determination, the court 
first had to confirm the interpretation that should be given to the term 
‘sculpture’ in terms of English copyright law.28 
The court in the Lucasfilm case looked to previous decisions and agreed 
that when determining the meaning of certain terms — such as ‘sculpture’ 
— within the Act, it must start with the ordinary meaning of the words of 
the statute.29 Lord Walker and Lord Collins first considered the decision of 
the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in the case of Wham-O Manufacturing 
Co v Lincoln Industries Ltd.30 It was held by the court in that case that the 
definition of   ‘sculpture’ could not be extended to include all works created 
by hand, but only to those works that express the idea of the sculptor in three-
dimensional form.31 The Supreme Court in the Lucasfilm case concluded 
by stating that the guidelines (discussed below) set out in the Wham-O 
Manufacturing case,   and which were accepted by Mann J in the trial court32 as 
well as the Court of Appeal in the Lucasfilm case,33 were correct, and should 
be followed when determining whether a work qualified as a sculpture.34 
24 [1997] FSR 718. The Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Wham-O 
Manufacturing Co v Lincoln Industries Ltd [1995] RPC 127 did not agree with 
the approach taken in Metix, arguing that the scope given to the definition 
of  ‘sculpture’ cannot be so broad as to include all works created by an artist’s 
hand. See the discussion below for clarification on the matter.
25 Metix ibid at 718.
26 Ibid at 720–2.
27 [2011] UKSC 39.
28 Ibid para 7.
29 Ibid para 29.
30 Supra note 24. The New Zealand Court of Appeal held that a wooden model 
for making a mould for the production of frisbee was a ‘sculpture’, but many consider 
this to be incorrect.
31 Wham-O Manufacturing ibid paras 30–5.
32 Lucasfilm Ltd & others v Ainsworth & another [2008] EWHC 1878 (Ch).
33 Lucasfilm Ltd & others v Ainsworth & another [2010] Ch 503 (CA) para 54.
34 Lucasfilm (UKSC) supra note 27 para 46. 
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The guiding principles that the court suggested should be followed when 
determining whether the work in question falls within the interpretation of 
‘sculpture’ are summarised succinctly by Stokes35 as follows:
‘1. Some regard has to be had to the normal use of the word “sculpture”.
2. Nevertheless, the concept can be applicable to things going beyond what 
one would normally expect to be art in the sense of the sort of things that 
one would expect to find in art galleries.
3. It is inappropriate to stray too far from what would normally be regarded as 
a sculpture.
4. No judgement is to be made about artistic worth.
5. Not every three-dimensional representation of a concept can be regarded as 
a sculpture. Otherwise every three-dimensional construction or fabrication 
would be a sculpture, and that cannot be right.
6. It is the essence of a sculpture that it should have, as part of its purpose, a 
visual appeal in the sense that it might be enjoyed for that purpose alone, 
whether or not it might have another purpose as well. This “purpose” is 
determined by looking at what the creator of the work intended it to be.36
7. The fact that the object has some other use does not necessarily disqualify it 
from being a sculpture, but it still has to have the intrinsic quality of “being 
intended to be enjoyed” as a visual thing.
8. The process of fabrication is relevant but not determinative.’
For the purposes of this article, guidelines two, three and six will 
specifically be considered and applied to a particular multimedia installation 
artwork to determine whether such a creation would fall within the scope 
of   ‘sculpture’ within the Act.
When considering William Kentridge’s Double Half Horse,37 the artist 
will have to try to fit his creation within the definition of ‘artistic work’ 
as a sculpture for the purposes of copyright protection as there is not, as 
yet, a defined category for multimedia installation artworks. However, as 
previously indicated, the term ‘sculpture’ is not defined in the Act, and the 
meaning of the term is only expressly extended to include a cast or model 
used in the creation of a sculpture.38 
The next relevant guideline is that the concept of sculpture could be 
applicable to things that go beyond what one would normally expect to 
be art.39 A substantial part of the Kentridge work is made up of a shadow 
35 Simon Stokes Art and Copyright (2012) 43. 
36 This requirement is in contradiction to the ruling of the court in the case of 
Bress Designs (Pty) Ltd & another v GY Lounge Suite Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd & another 
1991 (2) SA 455 (W), where subjective considerations were ruled out and it was held 
that the purpose of the work should be judged objectively.
37 Goodman Gallery ‘Sculpture for return (Double Half Horse), 2008, Bronze, 
Edition of 12’, available at http://www.goodman-gallery.com/exhibitions/439, accessed 
on 12 September 2019. 
38 Section 1 of the Act s v ‘sculpture’.
39 Stokes op cit note 35 at 43.
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projected onto the wall, an element that could be argued to extend beyond 
what is conventionally considered to be art. It is important to consider the 
point made in the Marick Wholesalers case, namely that one must consider a 
work as the ‘sum of its parts’, and not consider the individual components 
thereof separately.   Therefore, if one were to consider the Kentridge creation 
in its entirety, it could be argued that the physical bronze portion that casts 
a shadow would constitute a substantial part of the work, and would satisfy 
the definition of ‘sculpture’. 
The last of the guidelines to be taken into consideration is that it would 
be inappropriate, in the course of its interpretation, for a court to stray too 
far from what would normally be regarded as a sculpture. This guideline 
harks back to the words of Laddie J in the Metix case, namely that a sculpture 
is a three-dimensional work made by an artist’s hand.40
Considering that such a shadow could be reproduced without reproducing 
a substantial part of the bronze sculpture is somewhat problematic in light 
of the scope of protection afforded by the Act. This example shows that 
although a multimedia installation artwork may be protected under the Act, 
there are, arguably, substantial parts thereof that still remain unprotected. 
When considering the artwork in the illustrative example, the conclusion 
can be drawn that, even if the said creation was not illuminated, it still served 
an artistic purpose, being aesthetically pleasing. Although only half of the 
intended shadow was, prima facie, physically represented, the front half of 
the horse could not be said to serve a purely functional purpose. Rather, the 
front half of the horse serves a dual function; it is both aesthetically pleasing 
and allows for a shadow to be cast representing the back half of the horse, 
once illuminated. It is for this reason that such a creation would fall within 
the sixth guideline in that it can be enjoyed for that aesthetic purpose alone, 
without materially changing the nature of the artwork.
(iii) Multimedia installation artworks defined as a ‘work of craftsmanship’
The phrase ‘work of craftsmanship’ is similar to that of ‘sculpture’ in that 
there is no further definition, or description, of the expression in the Act. 
Hence, as above, we have to determine how the courts would interpret and 
apply this phrase in practice.41 Prior to 1992, subsec (c) of the definition 
of ‘artistic work’ referred to ‘works of artistic craftsmanship’ and ‘works of 
craftsmanship of a technical nature’, thus providing for a narrower definition 
within the Act.42 The amendment made in 1992 had the effect that such 
40 Metix supra note 24 para 34.
41 Cf Stokes op cit note 35 at 44.
42 This definition is narrower than the current definition on the basis that it 
required the work to have some degree of artistic merit before it could receive 
protection under either category.
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works of craftsmanship no longer require any form of artistic merit before 
they will receive protection under the Act.43
Although the Bress Designs case was decided prior to the 1992 amendment, 
Van Dijkhorst J held that the term ‘artistic craftsmanship’ was in any event 
obsolete, and so we can accept that he did not require any artistic merit 
in its interpretation.44 Van Dijkhorst J preferred the view of Pape J in the 
Australian case of Cuisenaire v Reed,45 who held that in order for an article 
to be a work of artistic craftsmanship, its main purpose should be artistic 
and not utilitarian in nature.46 One must not, as a consequence, consider the 
artistic quality of the work, but rather the object of the article in its creation. 
The test put forward by the court is purely objective in that it must be 
asked whether the work is generally made by craftsmen with an aesthetic, 
rather than a utilitarian, end in mind.47 By applying this test to the facts at 
hand, the court was able to conclude that although the couch design was 
aesthetically pleasing, it remained an article to be sat on, and would be sold 
as such. 48 This particular view has been shared in UK case law, with Lord 
Morris concluding that the work should be assessed in an objective way 
to determine whether it has the character of being functional.49 This does 
not mean that all articles that serve a utilitarian function will be denied 
protection under the definition of a work of craftsmanship. The following 
example substantiates this.
When considering Damien Hirst’s The Physical Impossibility of Death in 
the Mind of Someone Living, it can be seen that the artist makes use of a steel 
framework to create a ‘coffin’ in which he has placed the corpse of a shark 
preserved in embalming fluid. This particular artwork raises a number of 
issues when considering whether such a work is protected under the Act 
and, if so, under which category of   ‘artistic work’ such a creation would fall. 
The first issue to consider is whether such a creation would fall within the 
scope of the definition of an ‘artistic work’ under the Act, and the second 
issue is whether such a creation, once defined as a work, would meet all 
other requirements for copyright protection.
When considering whether the creation in question would fall within 
the scope of a sculpture, it can be seen that Hirst’s creation falls foul of 
43 Dean & Karjiker op cit note 2 para 2.6.5, as was the situation in the Bress 
Designs case supra note 36.
44 Bress Designs supra note 36 at 459.
45 [1963] VR 719 at 730.
46 Bress Designs supra note 36 at 465.
47 The argument could be made that the new meaning given to the definition of 
an artistic work would increase the chances of this having a wider application when 
testing whether a work would fall within the scope of the definition.
48 Bress Designs supra note 36 at 466.
49 George Hensher Ltd v Restawhile Upholstery (Lancs) [1975] RPC 31 at 54. 
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the sixth guideline. This guideline provides that a part of a sculpture’s 
purpose is to have some sense of visual appeal, so that it can be enjoyed for 
that purpose alone.50 Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that such a 
creation would not comply with this guideline, as a substantial portion of 
the components in the creation, arguably, do not serve any aesthetic purpose. 
If one were to remove the shark from the artwork one would be left with a 
steel frame holding glass panels in place so that the fluid used for preserving 
the shark does not run out. These elements make up a substantial part of 
the installation and serve only a functional purpose, which would put the 
artwork outside of the definition of a sculpture, if we were to consider 
the sixth guiding principle. The argument could be raised that this would 
amount to a fragmentary approach to copyright protection, on the basis that 
the work in question has been broken down to its individual components 
and not considered as the sum of its parts. It is an accepted principle that, 
when assessing the originality of a copyright work, a fragmentary approach 
must be avoided.51 
It is important, then, to remember the seventh guiding principle, which 
provides that although the work may serve some other purpose, it must still 
have the intrinsic quality of being intended to be enjoyed as a visual thing. 
The above discussion shows that every aspect of the work, excluding the 
actual shark, is intended merely to display the shark and does not itself serve 
as a visual component of the work. Furthermore, a dead shark, arguably, does 
not per se serve any aesthetic purpose. The components of the creation that 
serve no aesthetic purpose perform a function that allows for the sum of the 
components to comply with the overall aesthetic objective. This reasoning 
finds support in the third and fifth guiding principles, which require that 
one must not stray too far from what would normally be regarded as a 
sculpture and, further, that not every three-dimensional representation of a 
concept can be regarded as a sculpture. On this basis, it is difficult to fit such 
a creation within the scope of s 1(a), as a sculpture, and the artist would have 
to look to s 1(c) for the necessary protection.
As mentioned previously, s 1(c) under the definition of an ‘artistic work’ 
provides that a creation may be protected as a work of craftsmanship where 
that creation (irrespective of its artistic merit) serves an aesthetic purpose. 
Therefore, the artist will merely have to show that the main object of the 
50 Stokes op cit note 35 at 44.
51 Marick Wholesalers supra note 15, where the respondent disputed that there was 
anything original in the designs of the applicant’s watches on the basis that all of the 
various features that make up the Michel Herbelin watches could be found in other 
makes of watches which were on the market prior to the creation of the works in 
question. The court, however, held that a fragmentary approach to the enquiry of 
originality must be avoided and we are to consider the independent labour, skill and 
creativity applied to the entire work.
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creation in question is artistic in nature and not utilitarian, thus allowing us 
to disregard the purpose of each individual component of the work. The 
test put forward by Van Dijkhorst J above necessitates that two enquiries 
be undertaken and, if both enquiries are satisfied, such a creation can be 
accepted as a work of craftsmanship under s 1(c).
The first enquiry requires that the artist show that the creation in question 
would be considered to be a work of craftsmanship, and must involve some 
degree of production by hand, which requires either skill or special training.52 
The second enquiry, however, shifts the focus from the artist himself to the 
actual creation and considers the purpose of such a creation to determine 
whether the material expression thereof achieves that purpose.  The court in 
Bress Designs came to the correct conclusion that although the couch satisfies 
the first enquiry, its main purpose was to be bought and sold as a utilitarian 
object to be sat on.  Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that the purpose 
of Hirst’s creation is aesthetic rather than functional, contrary to the purpose 
determined by the court in the Bress Designs case.  There may, however, be 
some debate whether its execution involved skill (craftsmanship) or special 
training, and relevant judgement.
(iv) Multimedia installation artworks falling outside the scope of a ‘work’ in terms 
of the Act
All of the examples discussed above identify a pattern in the Act, which 
indicates that the further we stray from what would be traditionally accepted 
as art, which the Act uses as the basis for its categorisation, the more difficult 
it becomes to fit such a creation within the scope of a ‘work’ for the purposes 
of copyright protection. 
Tim Noble & Sue Webster’s Dirty White Trash (With Gulls) makes use 
of a number of existing elements to create a unique type of multimedia 
installation artwork.53  The artists in this example make use of discarded 
items formed into a ‘trash heap’, and once illuminated a shadow is cast onto 
a blank surface depicting the silhouettes of two people sitting back-to-
back. First, we must consider whether such a creation would fall into the 
scope of subsec (a) of ‘artistic work’ and, for the purposes of this enquiry, 
we will attempt to fit such a creation within the definition of a sculpture, 
as discussed above. In order to fit such a creation within the scope of the 
term ‘sculpture’, consideration must be given to the guiding principles 
which were endorsed and accepted in the Lucasfilm case.54 Taking into 
consideration all the guiding principles, it can be seen that the creation 
in this example will fail to comply with a large number of them. For the 
52 Neng & Tan op cit note 6 at 419.
53 See the annexure at the end of the article.
54 Lucasfilm (UKSC) supra note 27 para 46; Stokes op cit note 35 at 43.
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purposes of this article, however, we shall only consider the most problematic 
of the guiding principles, namely the seventh and eighth principles. 
An argument could be made that the creation in question fails to comply 
with the sixth guiding principle in that the three-dimensional representation 
fails to convey the concept of the author without illumination. The failure 
of the creation to satisfy the sixth guiding principle is amplified once we 
turn to the seventh guiding principle, which provides that, ‘[although] the 
object has some other use … it still has to have the intrinsic quality of being 
… enjoyed as a visual thing’.55 This seventh guiding principle, therefore, 
requires the object to have some form of aesthetic appeal over and above any 
other functional use it may serve the creation. When applying this guiding 
principle to the example at hand, one can conclude that a pile of ‘trash’ on 
the floor lacks any aesthetic appeal; it is, arguably, the silhouettes represented 
on the wall that it creates that transforms the work into something with an 
aesthetic appeal. In other words, the pile of trash has no aesthetic appeal in 
and of itself: it is largely functional, namely used to create the shadow, which 
then gives the artwork aesthetic appeal.
The eighth guiding principle endorsed by Mann J refers to the process of 
fabrication and, although this principle is not determinative, it is still relevant, 
and thus we are required to consider it. The term ‘fabrication’ refers to an 
industrial process whereby prepared components are put through a process 
of manufacture to create a finished product. The procedure followed by the 
artists in this example cannot be likened to a process of fabrication, as their 
process was more random and ad hoc in nature, following a method of trial 
and error with individual waste items to achieve the final artwork. Although 
the action of construction could be said to have taken place, this act of 
construction entailed balancing individual components on one another with 
no semblance of permanence or fabrication of any kind.
Therefore, the creation in the example, arguably, fails to satisfy any of the 
abovementioned guiding principles, allowing for the conclusion that such a 
multimedia installation would fail to qualify as a sculpture for the purposes 
of the Act. We will, therefore, have to consider whether it is possible to fit 
the illustrative example within the scope of a work of craftsmanship in order 
for the work to receive protection under the Act. The test that will have to 
be applied to the creation in question was put forward by Van Dijkhorst J 
in Bress Designs, and such a test requires the creation to comply with two 
separate enquiries. 
The more problematic requirements with regard to this example are that 
it must be shown that the artists’ hands produced the creation in question 
and that such production required either advanced skill or special training 
55 Ibid at 44.
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for its execution.56 By applying the requirements to the given example, it 
is clear that it was created by the artists’ hands; however, there is a question 
concerning the skill or special training required to produce such an artwork. 
Although the individual trash components were placed by hand, the entire 
procedure was an exercise in trial and error and, arguably, other than time, 
required little to no special skill in its execution. The technique adopted by 
Noble & Webster is somewhat rudimentary in comparison to that of Hirst. 
It is, according to current case law, this lack of special skill and technical 
precision in the creation process that leads this particular creation to fall 
short of the first requirement for a work of craftsmanship.
The second, and less problematic, enquiry to be satisfied is whether 
the material expression of the creation in question achieves the aesthetic 
purpose for which it has been created. It is important to note here that 
there is no requirement of artistic merit, and as long as the creation is not 
utilitarian in nature, the conclusion can be drawn that it serves an aesthetic 
purpose.57  Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that the creation of 
Noble & Webster serves an artistic purpose, and thus easily satisfies the 
second requirement of Van Dijkhorst J’s test.
Although Noble & Webster’s creation is easily able to satisfy the requirement 
of artistic purpose, it falls short when considering the requirement of skill 
and precision in executing such an artistic creation. It is for this reason that, in 
light of current copyright law, there would be a high probability that Noble 
& Webster would fail to categorise their creation as a work of craftsmanship 
for the purposes of copyright protection. There is also a concern of having 
an open-ended definition of  ‘artistic work’, which will be addressed below.
(b) A proposed amendment of the Act to recognise new art forms
It should be clear at this point that, from what has already been discussed, 
there is a need for some form of amendment of what is considered an 
‘artistic work’ for the purposes of the Act, in order for there to be effective 
protection of modern art forms. The question to be answered, therefore, 
is what form of amendment is required in order for there to be sufficient 
inclusion of these types of art forms within the definition of  ‘artistic work’. 
The first proposed approach would involve a change in the manner 
of interpretation of the already existing definitions within s 1 of the Act 
under ‘artistic work’, with specific regard to the definitions of ‘sculptures’ 
and ‘works of craftsmanship’. This article will, therefore, outline the current 
interpretations of such terms, as discussed above, and then suggest possible 
changes that could be made to allow for a broadening of the scope of the 
said terms. These suggested changes will then be tested against Noble & 
56 Neng & Tan op cit note 6 at 419.
57 Bress Designs supra note 36 at 466.
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Webster’s creation, in order to show that such a change may successfully 
include artworks similar to that by Noble & Webster, within the definition 
of an ‘artistic work’.
An alternative is an amendment which is more explicit than the 
proposed re-interpretation, and which would add a further category within 
subsec (a) of  ‘artistic work’, and would broaden the scope of subsec (a) of 
the Act. By explicitly broadening the scope of the Act, we seek to include 
creations such as that of Noble & Webster, thus providing such artists 
with the possibility of copyright protection. This proposed amendment, 
although effective in broadening the scope of protection, may raise a 
number of issues in determining the extent to which the scope of ‘artistic 
work’ should be broadened. 
(i) A new interpretation given to the existing categories of what constitutes an 
‘artistic work’
The proposed revised interpretation requires us to look at the existing 
interpretations that are given to the word ‘sculpture’ and the phrase ‘work of 
craftsmanship’ in order to determine whether new interpretations could be 
given to either category of artistic work, so as to broaden the scope thereof. 
This part of the article will, therefore, first consider the term ‘sculpture’, 
followed by the phrase ‘work of craftsmanship’, allowing for a conclusion to 
be drawn as to whether such new interpretations would solve the issue in 
question. 
(1) A new interpretation of the term ‘sculpture’
It has been shown above that a number of the principal guidelines accepted 
and endorsed in the Lucasfilm case do not sufficiently provide for multimedia 
installation artworks that are more abstract in nature than a sculpture. 
It must therefore be asked whether there is a sensible manner of amending 
the guiding principles and thus broadening their scope, allowing for 
creations such as Noble & Webster’s to be accepted as a sculpture for the 
purposes of the Act. The guidelines that pose the greatest limitation on the 
interpretation of ‘sculpture’ in this context are the fifth and first, alongside 
the third, and the following discussion will outline why an amendment 
thereto would be inappropriate. 
The fifth guiding principle is, for the purposes of this article, the most 
contentious when considering whether an amendment to this specific 
interpretation of the term ‘sculpture’ is possible. The fifth principle provides 
that ‘not every three-dimensional representation of a concept can be regarded 
as a sculpture’.58 From this it can be seen that the artistic work to which 
this specific guiding principle applies is required to be three-dimensional in 
58 Stokes op cit note 35 at 43.
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nature, and thus any creation lacking a third dimension will fail to comply 
with this principle. When considering the creations of Kentridge and Noble 
& Webster, they both include two-dimensional components, namely a 
shadow cast onto the wall.  As the court confirmed in the Marick Wholesalers 
case, we must not consider a work in terms of its individual components, 
but rather as a sum of its parts.59  Therefore, although ‘half’ of Kentridge’s 
creation will comply with this fifth principle, ‘half’ of it (as would be the case 
with a substantial part of Noble & Webster’s creation), will fail to satisfy the 
fifth principle due to the substantial two-dimensional aspects of the creations. 
It would be artificial to alter the three-dimensional requirement put forward 
in the fifth principle, without contradicting both the first and third principles, 
based on the common meaning given to the term ‘sculpture’.
The first and third principles can be read together, as they both require 
that some regard has to be given to the word ‘sculpture’, and that it would 
be inappropriate to stray too far from what would normally be regarded 
as such.60 From the dictionary definition of ‘sculpture’, the inference can 
be made that the term describes a creation that necessarily has a three-
dimensional quality.61 This further supports the argument that a substantial 
part of both the Kentridge and Noble & Webster creations consisting of 
two-dimensional elements would fail to satisfy both the first and third 
principles, alongside the fifth. 
The discussion above illustrates that the interpretation accepted by the UK 
Supreme Court contains a number of limitations, with the biggest limitation 
being that the creation in question must inherently be three-dimensional in 
nature. Multimedia installations, however, consist of a number of elements 
that are not three-dimensional in nature and, given the fact that they have 
to be considered as the sum of their parts, they would fall foul of this central 
requirement. In conclusion, it would not be appropriate to amend the 
current interpretation given to the guidelines that have to be followed when 
determining whether an artistic work falls within the scope of a ‘sculpture’ 
for the purposes of copyright protection.
(2) A new interpretation of the phrase ‘work of craftsmanship’
In the discussion concerning the interpretation of the phrase ‘work of 
craftsmanship’, the two-stage enquiry put forward by Van Dijkhorst J was 
the yardstick against which such creations should be measured.62 For the 
purposes of a new interpretation, the first part of the prescribed enquiry 
poses problems in that it requires a certain level of precision and skill being 
59 Marick Wholesalers supra note 15 at 717.
60 Stokes op cit note 35 at 43.
61 Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary 10 ed (1999) s v ‘sculpture’.
62 Bress Designs supra note 36 at 466.
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involved in the creation of the work.63 The second part of the enquiry 
merely requires that the creation in question serve an artistic purpose in 
that it has a principally aesthetic function. When applied to the works of 
both Kentridge and Noble & Webster, it can be seen that the bronze statue 
and the pile of discarded waste do in fact serve principally artistic purposes. 
Therefore, there is no need to amend the scope of the second part of the 
enquiry because it is broad enough to include such multimedia installation 
creations, as they serve an artistic purpose.
The first part of the enquiry is problematic in that it requires some form 
of skillful technique or special training in its production, as we discussed 
above with regard to Hirst’s work.64 The works of Kentridge and Noble & 
Webster consist of a trial-and-error process of creation, with both artworks 
comprising, in substantial part, projections cast from their illumination; 
the process of creation of such projections, arguably, lacks the precision or 
skilled technique required by the first part of  Van Dijkhorst’s requirements. 
This would definitely be more so in the case of the work of Noble & 
Webster. To overcome this obstacle, a possible reinterpretation could 
involve the removal of the requirement of precision and skilful technique 
from the enquiry, thus broadening the scope of what may be considered to 
be a work of craftsmanship. By removing the requirement of precision or 
skilful technique in the interpretation of a work of craftsmanship, the only 
requirement to be satisfied would be that the work be produced by the 
artist’s hand. By applying this new interpretation to the work of Noble & 
Webster, the conclusion can be drawn that it is an artistic work because it is 
produced by hand and serves an artistic purpose. 
However, such a possible reinterpretation would remove the requirements 
that are unique to the category of a ‘work of craftsmanship’, consequently 
rendering the category redundant as there would no longer be any specific 
characteristic to distinguish it from the other possible categories of ‘artistic 
work’. Therefore, if this reinterpretation were to be accepted, it would 
be more logical simply to remove subsecs (a) and (b) from the definition 
of ‘artistic work’ and just provide for a broad definition, which would 
essentially correspond with that of the reinterpreted subsec (c), with no 
requirement of skill or precision. 
(ii) An explicit amendment to the definition of ‘artistic work’
Rather than trying to fit new forms of artistic works into existing terminology 
in the Act, an alternative approach would involve amending subsec (a) of the 
definition of ‘artistic work’. Such an amendment will provide specifically for 
63 This precision and skill is technical in nature in that it relates to the use of 
precise measurement or calculation in the execution of the work in question.
64 Neng & Tan op cit note 6 at 419.
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the protection of multimedia installation artworks. Along with the proposed 
amendment of subsec (a) of  ‘artistic work’, an additional definition could be 
provided for in the Act to assist a court in its interpretation and application.
This article, therefore, proposes that the term ‘multimedia installation art’ 
be added to the list of kinds of work currently provided for under subsec (a) 
of the definition of ‘artistic work’, so as to provide for the protection of the 
artworks discussed above. However, adding the term ‘multimedia installation 
art’ alone would pose broad interpretative problems of its own, so it is 
necessary to limit the scope of its interpretation by providing a definition 
of the term, similar to that of  ‘sculpture’.65 The proposed definition will 
limit the term ‘multimedia art’ to include only a combination of those 
works already defined under the Act. ‘Multimedia installation art’ should, 
therefore, for the purposes of the Act, be defined along the following lines:
‘A work comprising of any combination of those works defined under 
subsection (a) of  “artistic work”, as well as, combinations with any other 
any other copyright works or any associated aspect of the work.’66
This definition does not limit the combination of components that 
are necessary in order for a multimedia creation to be considered a work 
for the purposes of the Act. Therefore, an artist may employ any number 
of combinations of different media in the creation, and will still have the 
creation protected within the scope of the Act.
(c) Concluding remarks
An explicit amendment to the Act is preferred, as it will pose fewer problems 
in its application by allowing for a clear definition that provides for the 
abovementioned artworks. However, certain issues regarding the other 
requirements provided for by the Act concerning the requirements for 
copyright subsistence may be raised. This is considered next.
III  PROBLEMS THAT MAY ARISE SHOULD THE DEFINITION 
OF ‘ARTISTIC WORK’ BE AMENDED
Having dealt with the main issue — whether a multimedia installation 
artwork can be considered to be a ‘work’ — consideration must be given to 
further issues that may arise if the Act were to recognise such creations as 
a ‘work’ for the purposes of copyright protection. The first issue relates to 
65 The addition of the term ‘multimedia installation art’ to the definition of an 
artistic work in s 1 of the Act without limitation would render those definitions 
currently provided by s 1 for ‘artistic work’ redundant, as it is possible to fit all art 
forms within the scope of  ‘multimedia installation art’ without limitation.
66 The inclusion of any ‘by-product’ of a copyright work would allow scope 
for shadows or any other projection emanating from the copyright work in 
question to be included within the new definition, as in the case of Kentridge’s 
Double Half Horse.
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the originality of the work in question, on the basis that most multimedia 
installations are created from already existing materials and, accordingly, 
questions may arise as to the level of judgement, skill and effort expended 
in creating the work. The second issue that may arise, should such creations 
be accepted as a ‘work’, relates to the requirement under s 2(2) of the Act. 
Most multimedia installations appear in public spaces or art galleries and do 
not exist in perpetuity, but rather for a finite period of time. Therefore, this 
article will seek to address what the materiality requirement entails.
(a) The issue of originality
There are two main issues that need to be addressed when considering 
whether multimedia installation artworks will satisfy the requirement of 
originality, if they are to be considered a ‘work’ in the Act. The first issue 
is whether the visual elements of an installation artwork involve enough 
judgement, skill and effort in their creation to be considered as original in 
terms of the Act. In order to address this issue, we will consider the work of 
Noble & Webster, and apply the assessment of originality thereto, in order to 
determine whether it complies with the requirement under s 2(2). 
The second issue pertains to the use of natural and ready-made objects 
in the creation of multimedia installation artworks, and whether such 
use would contradict the notion of originality. For this enquiry, we will 
consider the work of Hirst to determine whether it satisfies the requirement 
of originality.67 This issue is predicated on the concern that by granting an 
artist copyright over an artistic work containing natural objects, one would 
grant the artist a monopoly over a particular form of natural expression.68 
(i) Applying the test for originality to a multimedia installation artwork
The court in the case of Haupt v Brewers Marketing69 held that the term 
‘original’ means that the work in question should originate from the author 
and not be slavishly copied.70 It is important to note at this point that, 
although creative works will be original by definition, creativity is not 
a requirement for a work to be original.  This interpretation reflects the 
previous UK standard of the ‘sweat of the brow’ for determining originality, 
where focus is placed on the judgement, effort and skill expended in creating 
the work, and not on how creative the work actually is.71 The court in the 
Accesso case confirmed this position by stating that the degree of judgement, 
67 Damien Hurst ‘The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living, 
1991’, available at http://www.damienhirst.com/the-physical-impossibility-of, accessed on 
12 September 2019.
68 Neng & Tan op cit note 6 at 425.
69 2006 (4) SA 458 (SCA).
70 Ibid para 24.
71 Stokes op cit note 35 at 50.
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labour and skill required is a question of fact in each case, and the greater 
the amount of judgement, labour and skill, the more likely the work will be 
deemed to be original.72
On the basis that the author of a work needs to contribute effort in the 
creation of an original work, the next question that must be asked is how 
much of a contribution must be made before the originality requirement 
is satisfied. The court in the Marick Wholesalers case provided that the effort 
of the author must be non-mechanical and non-trivial in nature so as to 
satisfy the originality requirement.73 Therefore, the judgement, effort and 
skill put into creating the work must be of such a nature that it must not be 
characterised as a purely mechanical exercise.
In order to satisfy such a test, the author will have to show that, although 
being aware of pre-existing works, the author is able to distinguish his or 
her own work from the pre-existing works and demonstrate his or her own 
contribution.74 Therefore, the correct test to be applied when determining 
whether a work is original requires a purely subjective enquiry to be made into 
the individual efforts of the author in the creation of the work. When applying 
this test to an artistic work, the enquiry must address whether that judgement, 
skill and labour applied to the work pertains to the visually significant aspects 
of the work. This is particularly important when looking at a work that is 
derived from pre-existing works, where slavish copying may still occur even 
though a significant amount of judgement, skill and effort was put into the 
creation thereof. 75
The standard set by the test for originality is a low one, and it is not 
hard for an author of a work to satisfy the requirement of expended 
judgement, labour and skill in order to show that the work in question is 
in fact original.76 Therefore, when applying the test of originality to the 
work of Noble & Webster, a number of considerations have to be taken 
into account concerning pre-existing works and the amount of judgement 
and effort it took to create the work. When considering the work of Diet 
Wiegman, it can be seen that the work of Noble & Webster is not unique, 
or the first of its kind.77 Therefore, it must be asked whether Noble & 
Webster copied existing works in their creation to such a degree that their 
work was not original. Even though the concept may be the same, the 
process of rendering the material expression thereof is a process of trial and 
72 Accesso supra note 14 at 667–9.
73 Marick Wholesalers supra note 15 at 715–16.
74 Dean & Dyer op cit note 23 at 17.
75 Stokes op cit note 35 at 51.
76 Ibid at 50.
77 Diet Wiegman ‘Shadow Dancing, 2008’, available at https://shadowsculptures.
wordpress.com/2015/04/29/diet-wiegman/#jp-carousel-389, accessed on 12 September 
2019. The work is not ‘the first of its kind’ in that it is not the first artistic work to 
make use of a shadow cast on a wall in the execution of the work.
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error, as we have discussed above. Therefore, Noble & Webster would have 
to show that there is a significant difference in the visual aspects of the work 
in order to prove that the creation is not a slavish copy of works that already 
exist, such as that of Wiegman. 
The very nature of multimedia installation artwork is that the artist 
physically installs it in a space, and the standard of originality merely requires 
that effort and skill be expended in the creation of the work. This effort and 
skill must be directed at the visual aspects of the work when dealing with 
artistic works, and a comparison between the works of Noble & Webster 
on the one hand, and Wiegman on the other hand, evidences such effort. 
The visual aspects of both works are not so similar as to amount to a 
reproduction; even though they both portray the silhouettes of people, 
a large amount of effort and skill has gone into making the silhouettes 
differentiable. In conclusion, a strong argument could be made that 
multimedia installation artworks would easily comply with the requirement 
of originality, on the basis that the visual aspects of each work require a 
considerable amount of effort and skill in their execution.
(ii) Does the use of natural and ready-made objects in multimedia installation 
artworks conflict with the requirement of originality?
A number of multimedia installation artworks make use of ready-made, 
or natural, materials in their creation to convey a certain belief or idea to 
the observer that invites a certain emotional response to the work. It has 
been argued in US courts that artworks depicting natural objects in their 
expression would fail to satisfy the originality requirement, on the basis that 
no artist may monopolise an object ‘first expressed by nature’, as the court 
said in Satava v Lowry.78 
The argument is that the use of natural materials in the creation of 
an artistic work would be to copy from another work, namely the ‘first 
expression by nature’.79 Therefore, in order for an artist to meet the 
requirement of originality when copying from another work, he or she 
must be able to show that there is an element of material alteration or 
embellishment to make his or her own work original. The court in the case 
of Satava v Lowry held that an artist may alter ‘the pose, attitude, gesture, 
muscle structure [or] facial expression’ of the animal, and such variations, if 
original, may warrant copyright protection.80 
78 323 F 3d 805 at 813. See Neng & Tan op cit note 6 at 425. This requirement 
of originality will, therefore, fail if the artist does not apply some form of  ‘unnatural’ 
expression to the natural elements of the artistic work. An example of such an 
unnatural expression would be to portray a dead bird in mid-flight.
79 Neng & Tan ibid at 425.
80 Satava v Lowry supra note 78 at 813; Neng & Tan ibid at 425.
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Therefore, when considering the shark used in Hirst’s creation, the 
conclusion can be drawn that, by preserving the shark in formaldehyde 
and removing it from its natural habitat, he has materially altered the ‘first 
expression by nature’ of that animal. By adding embellishments to the 
natural object, the artist has contributed a sufficient amount of effort and 
skill towards the visual aspects of the work in order for the work to comply 
with the requirement of originality. Noble & Webster could raise the same 
argument with regard to the use of stuffed seagulls and pre-existing waste 
materials, and the alteration thereof, in their artwork, thus rendering such a 
work original for the purposes of copyright protection.
(b) The issue of materiality 
The second requirement that must be met in order for copyright to subsist in 
a work originates from art 2(2) of the Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works. The Act adopted the wording of art 2(2) of 
the Convention into s 2(2), which states that a work must be reduced to 
a material form, and the wording of s 2(2) of the Act does not explicitly 
exclude artistic works from that requirement.81 Copyright does not subsist in 
thoughts or ideas, but rather the material expression thereof; ideas must exist 
in a specific physical embodiment before they can be protected under the 
Act.82 Therefore, even though there is no express provision in the Act that 
artistic works must permanently be reduced to a material form, it has been 
widely accepted that this requirement is also satisfied where the work does 
not exist in perpetuity.83 Laddie J said in the Metix case that merely because 
an artwork has an inherently transient existence does not mean that it would 
not be able to satisfy the requirement of being reduced to a material form.84 
There has been no definite period of time provided in legislation or by 
the courts that must pass before a work could be said to have complied with 
the fixation requirement. However, there is an interpretation given to the 
term ‘permanence’.85  Therefore, an artistic work will be accepted as having 
the requisite degree of permanence if it can be ‘perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration’.86 
The court in the case of Pastel Software (Pty) Ltd v Pink Software (Pty) Ltd held 
that even though the material form of the work was no longer perceivable, 
81 Dean & Dyer op cit note 23 at 18.
82 Pastel Software (Pty) Ltd v Pink Software (Pty) Ltd (1991) 399 JOC (T) at 409.
83 Stokes op cit note 35 at 53.
84 Metix supra note 24 at 721.
85 The term ‘permanence’ is used in this context to relate to any work that has 
been reduced to a material form, and which would then exist for a period of more 
than transitory duration.
86 Joan Infarinato ‘Copyright protection for short-lived works of art’ (1982) 51 
Fordham LR 90 at 94.
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this did not mean that the copyright no longer existed (or never existed).87 
Artworks that consist of no static elements would find it difficult to satisfy 
the fixation requirement where the scope and subject matter of the work 
is not clearly ascertainable. In the Australian case of Komesaroff v Mickle & 
others,88 the court held that works of  ‘kinetic art’ lack sufficient permanence 
to be classified as ‘works’ for the purposes of copyright.89
The artwork of Noble & Webster is static enough whilst the trash element 
of the piece is illuminated, even if someone or something were to obstruct, 
or alter, the light causing the shadow to be cast. However, the argument 
could be made that without any external intervention, the artwork itself 
exists in a form of stasis, and such stasis is not influenced by the inherent 
nature of the artwork. On this basis it can be seen that the creation of Noble 
& Webster would also satisfy the materiality requirement on the basis that it 
too is perceivable for longer than a mere transitory duration. 
It is important to note that not all multimedia installations would satisfy 
the requirement of fixation, and a good example of such an artwork would 
be Damien Hirst’s A Thousand Years.90 Because the artwork is constantly 
changing with the addition of dead flies and the dissipation of organic 
materials, it is hard to identify a single static element in the artwork. There 
is no preservation of the elements in A Thousand Years, and, therefore, it 
cannot be said to comply with the requirement of materiality in s 2(2). 
Although the initial form of the work exists for a fleeting moment, an 
argument could be made that the requirement of ‘materiality’ must be 
changed to incorporate artworks that exist for fleeting moments before such 
change occurs.
The conclusion can be drawn from the preceding discussion that, 
although there is no direct provision in the Act that artworks must be 
reduced to a material form for a definite period of time, academic writers 
are of the opinion that it is a necessary requirement based on evidentiary 
considerations.91 Therefore, although multimedia installation artworks do 
not exist in the same location, but are moved from gallery to gallery (as is 
the case with traditional artworks), the elements that make up the artwork 
itself are static in nature, and are, therefore, fixed in space.92 
87 Pastel Software supra note 82 at 409–10.
88 [1988] RPC 204.
89 Stokes op cit note 35 at 52. See for an example of kinetic art Ilana Yahav Sand 
Art available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_jfS2rybDOg&t=17s, accessed on 
12 September 2019.
90 Damien Hurst A Thousand Years available at http://www.damienhirst.com/a-
thousand-years, accessed on 12 September 2019.
91 Zahr K Said ‘Copyright’s illogical exclusion of conceptual art’ (2016) 39 
Columbia J of Law & the Arts 335 at 339–400.
92 This is not peculiar to multimedia installation artworks, as a number of 
sculptures and works of craftsmanship are so big that they too require disassembly 
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(c) Concluding remarks
From the above discussion, the conclusion can be drawn that, if we were to 
implement the proposed amendments to the Act, the further requirements 
of originality and materiality would not be so contentious as to render 
such amendments redundant. It can be seen that, even though multimedia 
installation artworks consist of ready-made or natural materials, they are 
still able to comply with the requirement of originality on the basis that 
they satisfy the required level of effort and skill. Further, when we consider 
the fixation requirement under s 2(2) of the Act, we must not look at the 
fixation of the artwork in its surroundings but rather the fixation of the 
elements that make up the artwork itself. Although not all multimedia 
installation artworks will comply with the fixation requirement, as indicated 
above, if the Act is amended, as proposed, the issue of materiality will not be 
so contentious so as to render such an amendment redundant in relation to 
a vast spectrum of multimedia artworks.
IV CONCLUSION
The introductory part of this article noted that before an enquiry can be 
made into copyright infringement and the possible defences thereto, one 
must first address the issue of copyright subsistence. This article, therefore, 
set as its objective to determine whether the inherent nature of multimedia 
installation art prevents it from adequate recognition under copyright law in 
South Africa. In order complete this objective, the test for possible copyright 
subsistence was applied to four prominent multimedia installation artworks, 
and the outcome of this analysis shows that the wording of the Act is, 
arguably, somewhat restrictive in its interpretation and application.
The second part of this article sought to determine whether the current 
wording of the Act limited the scope of its application and failed to include 
multimedia installation artworks within the definition of ‘artistic work’ in 
s 1(1). From the discussion above, it can be seen that, when considering 
multimedia installation artworks, the further we stray from what has 
conventionally been recognised as an ‘artistic work’, the harder it becomes 
to interpret the Act in order to provide such creations copyright protection. 
This analysis, therefore, provided an answer to the question posed in the 
introductory part of this article, namely whether the inherent nature of a 
multimedia installation artwork prevents it from being recognised as such 
by the Act. In conclusion, it is clear that it is not the inherent nature of 
multimedia installation art, but rather a limitation imposed by the wording 
of the Act, and the judicial interpretation thereof, that renders such creations 
in order to be relocated. However, the inherent nature of multimedia installations 
requires their disassembly in order to be relocated, and such disassembly cannot be 
said to negate reduction to a material form.
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potentially ineligible for copyright protection. Seeing that the issue lies with 
the wording of the Act, the second objective of part II was to determine 
whether a revised interpretation given to the current wording of the Act, 
or adding new terminology thereto, would provide the necessary solution. 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that the more preferable approach 
is that a new term be added to the definition of ‘artistic work’ that provides 
for multimedia installation artworks in a general sense. The addition of this 
term will be accompanied with the addition of a definition of ‘multimedia 
art’ to the definitions section of the Act, which will limit the scope of 
the term. This definition does not, however, limit the combination of 
components that are necessary in order for a multimedia creation to be 
considered a work for the purposes of the Act. 
Part III of this article sought to build on the conclusions drawn in part II 
and address any possible issues that could arise if the proposed amendment 
were to be incorporated into the Act. From that analysis, it can be seen that 
multimedia installation artworks would still meet the standard of originality, 
on the basis that South African law measures the amount of effort and skill 
put into the creation of the work, rather than the artistic quality thereof. 
By placing an emphasis on the skill, labour and judgement of the author, 
rather than the make-up of the work itself, the test for originality should 
be satisfied if the proposed amendments were to be incorporated into the 
Act. Further, although the Act requires that a work be reduced to a material 
form before it can be considered a work eligible for copyright protection, 
the analysis in part III of this article shows that this requirement sets a low 
standard that must be met. Although there are examples of multimedia 
installation artworks that may not comply with this requirement, as 
identified above, it is not so contentious as to affect the general efficacy of 
the proposed amendments. 
Thus, in the final analysis, it is submitted that a case has been made out for 
an amendment to the definition of ‘artistic work’ in the Act so as to make 
provision for multimedia installation artworks, and that such an amendment 
is a viable solution to the identified shortcomings of the Act. Although 
a revised interpretation of what is currently defined as an ‘artistic work’ 
could be somewhat problematic, the inclusion of multimedia installation 
art within this definition would seem to have the most effective outcome. 
However, this article also submits that there should be a limitation on the 
scope of what will be considered to be multimedia installation art for the 
purposes of the Act.
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ANNEXURE:
Tim Noble & Sue Webster’s ‘Dirty White Trash (With Gulls)’
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